



A Struggle for the Sahara: Idrīs ibn 'Alī's Embassy to Aḥmad al-Manṣūr in the Context of Borno-Morocco-Ottoman Relations, 1577-1583

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Introduction

The Borno Sultanate (North East Nigeria) is one of the oldest states on the southern shores of the Sahara.[1] In the sixteenth century, it was a major actor in the whole *Bilād al-Sudān* (the medieval Arab term for sub-Saharan Africa) and in its relations with the Mediterranean Islamic states. From the thirteenth century, the Sefuwa dynasty, rulers of the Borno Sultanate, sent ambassadors to Cairo, Tunis, Istanbul and Tripoli (Libya), following the trans-Saharan routes in order to increase and regulate trade, to protect Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and to acquire recognition as an Islamic state in the *Umma*, the Islamic community. In the sixteenth century, the Borno Sultanate entered into a prosperous period under the rule of Idrīs ibn 'Alī, known as Idrīs Alaoma (1564-1596).[2] A particular aspect that characterises his reign is the amount of written sources at our disposal, especially between 1564 and 1584. This abundance of sources is unique during the long history of the Sefuwa dynasty. The most voluminous are two endogenous manuscripts narrating the first twelve years of Idrīs ibn 'Alī's reign. They were written in the period 1576-1578 by the head imam of the court, Aḥmad ibn Furṭū.[3] The other sources reflect the diplomatic activity of this Sultan, which was evident in Timbuktu,[4] Cairo,[5] Tripoli (Libya),[6]

> Several historians tried to understand the reasons, the stakes and the consequences of this embassy, both from the Bornoan perspective and the Moroccan one.



Istanbul,[7] Fez and Marrakesh. Among them, the description of the 1581-1583[8] embassy of Idrīs ibn ʻAlī to Aḥmad al-Manṣūr (1578-1603), the Sultan of Morocco, is remarkable. Indeed, the vizier and personal secretary of al-Manṣūr, ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz b. Muḥammad al-Fishtālī (d. 1622-3), described this episode in the *Manāhil al-ṣafā*.[9]

Several historians tried to understand the reasons, the stakes and the consequences of this embassy, both from the Bornoan perspective and the Moroccan one. It is generally agreed that al-Manṣūr used this embassy in order to define his African policy and enhance his prestige through a Caliphal rhetoric;[10] however, the motivations of Idrīs ibn ʻAlī are quite unclear. Some historians have claimed that the purpose of Idrīs' diplomatic activity towards Morocco was to obtain firearms, after Istanbul had denied the same request.[11] Other historians have challenged this analysis and placed the embassy in the context of the competition between powers in the Saharan region, suggesting that Idrīs ibn ʻAlī tried to secure his State against the imperialism of both Moroccans and Ottomans.[12]

This writer agrees that the stakes of this embassy went beyond the simple debate on firearms, but the numerous differences between the interpretations of historians show that this diplomatic episode was never clearly understood. In this paper, the writer proposes a new analysis, redefining the context and the chronology in which this event occurred and stressing the importance of the human, political and religious networks that were established between Morocco, Borno and the oases of the Western and Central Sahara.

> The writer will then propose an interpretation of the Bornoan stakes and objectives within the geopolitical tensions for the control of the main oases of the trans-Saharan trade routes.

A brief description of the Bornoan embassy is followed by an analysis of this diplomatic exchange between the Saharan actors in the context of the Ottoman interventionism in

Africa and the resistance it provoked. The writer will then propose an interpretation of the Bornoan stakes and objectives within the geopolitical tensions for the control of the main oases of the trans-Saharan trade routes.

1581-1583: A Borno Embassy to Morocco

The establishment of contacts between Morocco and Borno across the Sahara is not self-evident. There are very few records regarding commercial and diplomatic relations between Morocco and the Lake Chad area. Both Morocco and Borno developed vertical trade networks rather than the Northwest-Southeast diagonal. In fact, the main sub-Saharan African economic partners of Morocco were Mali and Songhai while Tunis, Tripoli and Egypt were the main Mediterranean partners of the Borno Sultanate.[13] However, some connections between Morocco and Borno existed. Some traces of human exchanges are detectable all through the Middle-Ages and the Early Modern period. The first contacts date back to the thirteenth century, when a Moroccan writer recalls the presence of a scholar from the Lake Chad area in Morocco.[14] A letter written in 1440 and found in the Touat oases, close to Morocco, might attest to trade contacts with Borno.[15] Moreover, religious scholars from both sides travelled between the two shores of the Sahara: the *Kano Chronicle* mentions some Moroccan scholars travelling in the neighbourhood of Borno.[16] In the seventeenth century, a Sufi shaykh from Borno made a pious visitation to the grave of a famous shaykh of the Shādiliyya order, ibn ʻAbbās, in Fez.[17]

Moreover, the conquest of Tunis was the occasion for the Ottoman troops to initiate an imperialist policy into the interior of Africa.

Nevertheless, the Borno embassy to Morocco is unique. It was undertaken by a diplomat, *al-ḥājj* Yūsuf.[18] After having performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, *al-ḥājj* Yūsuf made at least two diplomatic journeys to Istanbul in 1577-1578 and 1579.[19] In the aftermath, he made three journeys to Morocco between 1581 and 1583. One aspect of his embassy has caught the attention of many historians: this concerns the hypothetical pledge of allegiance that Idrīs ibn ʻAlī made to Aḥmad al-Manṣūr. During the second visit of *al-ḥājj* Yūsuf, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr proposed to submit Idrīs ibn ʻAlī, the Sultan of Borno, a *bay'a:* an act of submission in which Idrīs would recognise Aḥmad al-Manṣūr as his Caliph.[20] According to al-Fishtālī, *al-ḥājj* Yūsuf died on his third journey before delivering the Sultan's answer. Nevertheless, his travel companions brought an answer that satisfied Aḥmad al-Manṣūr.[21] In al-Fishtālī's description, Idrīs ibn ʻAlī serves simply as a foil for the Caliphal propaganda of Aḥmad al-Manṣūr.[22] It does not explain why the Borno ruler would send an embassy to Morocco with the aim of recognising Aḥmad al-Manṣūr as his Caliph.[23]

If we postulate that al-Fishtālī's statement is true, then we must understand why Idrīs ibn ʻAlī undertook such an initiative and also understand just what the interests of the Borno Sultan were. This raises the issue of the common interests that Borno and Morocco had against a new political actor in Africa, namely the Ottoman Empire.

1570-1580: The Ottoman Decade and its Resistance

The first intervention that the Ottoman Empire led in Africa was the conquest of Egypt, in 1517. Their control of Cairo, followed by the conquest of Mecca and Medina, the two holy cities of Islam, and their victories against the Habsburgs gave them a strong legitimacy in the Western *Dār al-Islām*. This also had great consequences in North Africa, where the Ottomans established their suzerainty over Algiers (1533) Tripoli (1551) and Tunis (1569-74) in the context of corsair raiding in the Mediterranean Sea.[24] Moreover, the conquest of Tunis was the occasion for the Ottoman troops to initiate an imperialist policy into the interior of Africa.

In 1576, the Moroccan ruler ʻAbd al-Mālik

recognised the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan Murad III.[25] In 1577, the Ottoman officer Mahmud Bey led from Tunis the conquest of the Fezzan oases, an important commercial crossroad in the Central Sahara.[26] This conquest challenged the Bornoan influence in Fezzan and the initiatives Idrīs ibn ʻAlī had undertaken in 1565.[27] In 1579 and 1581,the governor of Algiers tried to send expeditions in order to control the Touat oases.[28] However, these initiatives were fragile considering the weakness of Ottoman central power in this area: internal conflicts in each city and rivalries between the regions gave an opportunity to Borno and Morocco to react to Ottoman intrusions.

At first, the answers to the Ottoman interventions in inner Africa were diplomatic in nature. Between 1574 and 1579, Idrīs ibn ʻAlī sent *al-ḥājj* Yūsuf to Istanbul in order to ask the Ottomans, among other things, to give back a seized fortress named *Fezzān.*[29] The request had mixed results. On the one hand, the Ottoman sultan refused to return the region to the Borno sultan.[30] On the other hand, he gave some strict orders to the Ottoman authorities of the oases, meant to regulate the relations between the local authorities and the Borno subjects.[31]

It is not a coincidence if the proclamation of the Caliphate by Ahmad al-Mansur, the Borno embassy and the revolt in Fezzan happened in a relatively quick succession.

In Morocco, the rise of Aḥmad al-Manṣūr led to tense diplomatic relations and a progressive break between Istanbul and Morocco. After the battle of *al-ksar al-kabīr* in 1578, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr succeeded in taking advantage of the rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburgs in Spain. In 1582, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr declared his full independence and proposed himself as a regional alternative to the universalism of the Ottomans by reviving the ideology of the western caliphate.[32] The Shādhiliyya, a Sufi order, transmitted Aḥmad's Caliphal propaganda. The Shādhiliyya was spread through all Saharan regions, as far as the Sahara's southern shores and perhaps even as far as the Borno Sultanate.[33] The presence of religious actors, Sufi orders and even political actors[34] from Morocco in West Africa guaranteed the diffusion of information. News of the politico-religious opposition between Istanbul and Morocco might have reached the Bornoan court as a result of those connections, and this might be the reason why Idrīs ibn ʻAlī sent an embassy to Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, in the context of frontier tensions in Fezzan.

Stakes and Objectives of Borno in the Moroccan Embassy

The control of the Fezzan oases was a crucial issue for Borno. These oases had been conquered by the Sefuwa Sultans in the thirteenth century. After a period of troubles between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the Sefuwa influence over Fezzan diminished, the political situation was stabilised under the rule of a Moroccan *sharīf* performing the Pilgrimage to Mecca; he was known as Muḥammad al-Fāsī. The Ottoman conquest of Fezzan (1577) forced his successors to flee to the south, to Katsina (today's northern Nigeria), close to the Borno Sultanate.[35] Muḥammad al-Fāsī's origins,[36] social status and mediation role in a local conflict, might suggest that he was a Sufi shaykh. The Moroccan origin of Muhammad al-Fāsī's dynasty and the place of their exile, close to Borno, highlight the religious and political network that bonded the two regions. The Fezzan oases might have preoccupied Aḥmad al-Manṣūr and Idrīs ibn ʻAlī; this was a nodal point and the Ottoman presence probably disturbed the Saharan networks.

The Ottoman occupation of Fezzan did not last for long. Between 1582-3 and 1585, the entire Ottoman garrison was slaughtered and the ancient rulers of Fezzan came back from exile.[37] As John Wright has suggested, the Borno Sultanate probably supported this uprising.[38] The proximity between this event and the Borno embassy to Morocco is striking, and my hypothesis is that these two events are tied together. Hence, the

question of Fezzan and the opposition to the presence of the Ottomans in the Sahara are, in my opinion, issues that could explain the embassy of *al-ḥājj* Yūsuf; Idrīs ibn ʻAlī had a real interest in negotiating with Aḥmad al-Manṣūr and accepting to give his *bayʻa*. This pledge of allegiance was purely symbolic, and had no impact on the effective power of Idrīs ibn ʻAlī over Borno and its surroundings.[39] What seems probable is that Idrīs ibn ʻAlī took advantage of the opposition between Aḥmad al-Manṣūr and Murad III in order to solve a local issue.

The Ottoman presence in Africa was recent, and their takeover of Fezzan was a serious issue for Bornoan interests: it is the only moment in Early Modern History when a Borno ruler sent embassies as far as Istanbul and Morocco in order to request military support or to complain about the behaviour of Ottoman authorities in Fezzan. Yet, before the 1580s, a military intervention against Ottoman troops was hardly conceivable. Tripoli and Cairo, under Ottoman rule, were important economic partners, and the Islamic legitimacy of Ottoman Sultans, as protector of the Holy cities of Islam, was strong. This economic, political and religious legitimacy was challenged by Aḥmad al-Manṣūr when he claimed the Caliphate title over the *Dār al-Islām*. This gave Idrīs ibn ʻAlī the opportunity to challenge the Ottoman hegemony and Islamic legacy in Fezzan.

Beyond the debates of the supposed allegiance of Idris ibn `Ali to Ahmad al-Mansur, we can thus see the Borno embassy as a political reaction to the Ottoman incursions into the African continent.

We can thus understand Idrīs ibn ʻAlī's *bayʻa* to Aḥmad al-Manṣūrin in this specific context. It is not a coincidence if the proclamation of the Caliphate by Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, the Borno embassy and the revolt in Fezzan happened in a relatively quick succession. Without recognising Aḥmad al-Manṣūr as the true Caliph of Islam, any action against the Ottomans could be interpreted as an attack against the *umma*. After such a recognition, on the contrary, a military action against the Ottomans in Fezzan was probably made legitimate in the eyes of the local and regional religious elites. Thus, Idrīs ibn ʻAlī was able to keep his actions within an Islamic legal framework, while at the same time obtaining the control of the trans-Saharan trade routes between Tripoli and Borno from the Ottomans.

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to incorporate the Borno embassy to Morocco into a wider context and to emphasise the active role of Idrīs ibn ʻAlī in Saharan politics at the time. Two historians have already proposed linking the Fezzan revolt with the Borno-Moroccan relations, but they have interpreted the Borno embassy to Morocco as a consequence of this revolt.[40] A more accurate chronology, however, shows that this revolt happened either during the same year, or shortly after the Borno-Morocco embassy. Therefore, I suggest that the Fezzan revolt was rather a consequence of the embassy to Morocco: Idrīs ibn ʻAlī needed political support and an Islamic legal framework in order to attack the Ottomans in Fezzan. The *bayʻa* to Aḥmad al-Manṣūr enabled him to satisfy both needs. Morocco and Borno had strong ties with the Fezzan oases, and it was in their interests to expel the Ottomans from them. Beyond the debates of the supposed allegiance of Idrīs ibn ʻAlī to Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, we can thus see the Borno embassy as a political reaction to the Ottoman incursions into the African continent. The capture of the Fezzan oasis would lead to an effective control of the Borno-Kawar-Fezzan-Tripoli trade road by the Sefuwa Sultans for over a century and the validation of the imperialist ambitions of the first Sultan of the Saʻadī dynasty in Morocco, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, in the direction of West Africa.

Notes

1 This article is an extension of a paper that was presented at the annual conference of the *African Studies Association*, 17-19 November, 2011, at Washington D.C. The original title was "Diplomatic contacts between Central Sudan and

Mediterranean States in the 16th Century: the Embassy of Idrīs Alaoma to Aḥmad al-Manṣūr of Morocco (1583): a Case Study." The author would like to thank Total for the award of a three-year grant from 2009 to 2012, without which this work would not have been possible. The author would also like to thank Güneş Işıksel for his precious help with the Ottoman sources.

2 See Jean-Louis Triaud, "Idris Alaoma," in Charles-André Julien (editor), *Les Africains, T. III* (Paris: Ed. J.A., 1977), pp. 45-71.

3 Dierk Lange, *A Sudanic Chronicle: the Bornu Expeditions of Idris Alauma (1564-1576), according to the Account of Ahmad b. Furṭū* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Vierlag Wiesbaden, 1987); Sir Herbert Richmond Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs, three volumes in one* (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1928 (1967)).

4 Aḥmad Bābā, *Mi'raj al-Sū'ūd (1614-1615)* (Rabat: Bibliothèque générale A.M., Section des manuscrits, Réf. D. 930), 365-374; edition and translation in Zakari Dramani-Issifou, *L'Afrique Noire dans les relations internationales au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Karthala, 1982), p. 114.

5 *Senato Dispaci Consoli Egitto*, 25 sett. 1565, d. 49 (Venice: Archivio di Stato di Venezia, 1565), p. 122.

6 French-Surgeon, *L'histoire chronologique du royaume de Tripoly de Barbarie: Tome Premier divisé en six parties* (Paris: Bibliothéque Nationale de France, MF 12219), 171v, 178v, 198r.

7 *Mühimme Defterleri* (Istanbul), XXIV n° 359, *MD* XXX n° 439-440, XL n° 138, 197; Orhonlu, Cengiz, "Osmanlı – Bornu Münâsebetine Âid Belgeler," *Tarih Dergisi*, 23, 1969, pp. 111–131.

8 The first embassy arrived in Morocco in 990/1582-3. This means that the envoy was sent by Idrīs ibn 'Alī in 1581, considering the time required for the journey between Borno and Morocco.

9 The *Manāhil al-ṣafā* was considered to be lost for a long time, until some fragments were discovered in Rabat. These were edited in 1973 by 'Abd al-Karīm, al-Fištālī, Abū Fāris 'Abd al-'Azīz, Karīm, *et al.* (eds.), *Manāhil al-ṣafā fī māthir mawālīnā al-shurafā* (Rabat: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 1973). Another description of this event with more details was written by a Moroccan historian at the end of the nineteenth century (André Graulle *et al.* (transl.), *Kitāb al-istiqsa' fī akhbār duwal al-Maghrīb al-'Aqsâ (Histoire du Maroc), par Ahmed ben Khaled en-Naçiries-Slaoui. Tome V: Les Saâdiens (1509-1609)* (Archives marocaines, XXX, 1936). It seems that there are some discrepancies between these two texts, especially concerning the chronology of the events. Finally, Muhammad al-Hajj has translated this episode in an annex to his article, "Some diplomatic correspondence of the Seifuwa Mais of Borno with Egypt, Turkey and Morocco," in Yusuf Bala Usman and Muhammad Nur Alkali (eds.), *Studies in the History of pre-Colonial Borno* (Kano: Northern Nigerian Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 171-174.

10 Nabil Mouline, *Le califat imaginaire d'Ahmad al-Mansûr: Pouvoir et diplomatie au Maroc au xvie siècle* (Paris: PUF, 2009), p. 68; Mercedes Garcia-Arenal, *Ahmad al-Mansur: The Beginning of Modern Morocco* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), pp. 101-102.

11 Dahiru Yahya, *Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in an African Foreign Policy* (Harlow, Essex: Longman's Press, 1981), p. 148; al-Hajj, "Some diplomatic correspondence," p. 162; Garcia-Arenal, *Ahmad al-Mansur*, pp. 100-101; Mouline, *Le califat imaginaire*, p. 316.

12 Bawuro M. Barkindo, "Le Kanem-Borno, ses relations avec la Méditerranée, le Baguirmi et les autres Etats du bassin du Tchad," in Bethwell Allan Ogot (editor), *Histoire Générale de l'Afrique* (Paris: UNESCO, 1999), pp. 590-591; Zakari Maikorema, *Les raisons d'une ambassade bornuane au Maroc en 1583: Une réinterpretation* (Rabat: Publications de l'Institut des Etudes Africaines, 1991), p. 20.

13 Rémi Dewière, "Regards croisés entre deux ports de désert. L'enjeu des sources pour l'étude des relations entre Tripoli et le sultanat de Borno," *Hypothèses*, 1 (2012/2013), pp. 383-393; Jean Schmitz, "L'Islam en Afrique de l'Ouest, les méridiens et les parallèles," *Autrepart,* 16 (2000), pp. 117-137.

14 Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Kānemī (ca. 1200), lived in Morocco; Mohammed Bencherifa, *Ibrâhîm al-Kanimî, d. 609/1212-13, figure illustre dans les relations culturelles entre le Maroc et Bilâd al-Sûdân* (Rabat: Université Mohammed V, Institut des Etudes Africaines, 1991).

15 Alfred George Paul Martin, *Les oasis sahariennes* (Algiers: L'Imprimerie Algérienne, 1908), pp. 122-123. This letter is independent from the famous testimony of Antonio Malfante (1447). Its original, whose editor claims to come from Borno, was never published. Nothing in the text of the letter indicates that the author is a Borno Sultan, but several scholars attributed it to 'Alī Gājī (1465-1497). See Joseph Cuoq, *Recueil des sources arabes concernant l'Afrique occidentale du VIIIe au XVIe siècle (Bilâd al-Sùdân)* (Paris: ed. du CNRS, 1975), pp. 436-437.

16 Murray Last, "Charisma and Medicine in Northern Nigeria," in Donald B. Cruise O'Brien and Christian Coulon (eds.), *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 189.

17 Mouhammad Al-Qâdiri and Edouard Michaux-Bellaire (translators), *Nachr al-Mathânî, II, De l'an 1051 (1641 J.-C.) à l'an 1100 (1688 J.-C.)* (Archives marocaines, XXIV, 1917), pp. 259-260.

18 Fishtālī, *Manāhil*, p. 68.

19 For more about the 1577-8 embassy, see Bradford Martin, "Mai Idris of Bornu and the Ottoman Turks, 1576-78," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3, 4 (1972), p. 474; Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs*, 1, p. 69. For more about the 1579 embassy, see *Mühimme Defterleri* XL n° 138.

20 Al-Naṣīrī dates the *bay'a* as Muḥarram 990 (26 January-25 February 1582), which would mean that the first embassy arrived in Morocco in 1581 (Graulle *et al.*, *Kitāb al-istiqsa'*, p. 192).

21 Graulle *et al.*, Kitab al-istiqsa'; Dramani-Issifou, *L'Afrique Noire*, p. 134.

22 Mouline, *Le califat imaginaire*, p. 121.

23 In Aḥmad ibn Furṭū's narrative, Idrīs ibn 'Alī also bears the Caliphal title (Palmer, *Sudanese Memoirs*, 1, p. 15).

24 Emrah Safa Gürkan, "The center and the frontier: Ottoman cooperation with the North African corsairs in the sixteenth century," *Turkish Historical Review*, 1 (2010), pp. 125-163; Güneş Işıksel, "Le statut de la Tripolitaine dans l'éspace politique Ottoman au xvie siècle," *Hypothèses*, 1 (2012/2013), pp. 375-382.

25 Mouline, *Le califat imaginaire*, p. 119.

26 Some sources affirm that Fezzan was first occupied by the Ottomans between 1553 and 1573. The oases appear in a list of territories under the administration of the Algiers *vilayet*. It seems that following the Ottoman presence in Tripoli, they increased their influence to Fezzan (Ferifun Emecen and Ilhan M.-Sahin, "Osmanli Tasra Teskilâtinin Kaynaklarindan 957-958 (1550-1551) Tarihi Sancak Tevcîh Defteri I (42 sayfabelgeilebirlikte)," *Belgeler*, 19, 23 (1998), p. 98). Bearing in mind the 1574 conquest, which seems much more credible, see Alain Blondy, "Présentation," in Anne-Charles Froment De Champlagarde, *Histoire abrégée de Tripoly de Barbarie 1794 et Suite de l'Histoire de la régence de Tripoly de Barbarie règne d'Ali Caramanly 1793* (Paris: Editions Bouchène, 2001), p. 17.

27 Lange, *A Sudanic Chronicle*, p. 38; John E. Lavers, "Adventures in the chronology of the states of the Chad basin," in Daniel Barreteau and Charlotte Von Graffenried (eds.), *Datation et chronologie dans le bassin du lac Tchad* (Paris: ORSTOM, 1993), p. 258.

28 Dramani-Issifou, *L'Afrique Noire*, pp. 132-3.

29 Bradford Martin read *Q.rān* instead of *F.zān* (Martin, "Mai Idris", p. 477). This misreading was retaken by the historiography after him.

30 Martin, "Mai Idris," p. 478.

31 *Mühimme Defterleri* XXX n° 440; see Martin, "Mai Idris," p. 481.

32 Mouline, *Le califat imaginaire*, p. 121.

33 Garcia-Arenal, *Ahmad al-Mansur*, p. 52; Constant Hamès, "La Shâdhiliyya ou l'origine des confréries islamiques en Mauritanie," *Cahiers de recherche du Centre Jacques Berque*, 3(2005), pp. 7-19; Rémi Dewière, "Aḥmad ibn Furṭū, portrait d'un *'ālim* soudanais du xvi[e] siècle," in Nicola Melis and Mauro Nobili (eds.), *Futūḥ al-buldān: Sources for the Study of Islamic Societies/Fonti per lo studio delle società islamiche* (Rome: Aracne, 2012), pp. 39-54.

34 See below.

35 Gustav Nachtigal, Allan G. B. Fisher & Humphrey J. Fisher (translators), *Sahara and Sudan* (London: Hurst & Company, 1980), vol. 1, p. 151; Bradford Martin, "Ahmad Rasim Pasha and the suppression of the Fazzan Slave Trade, 1881-1896," *Africa* (Roma), 38, 4 (1983), pp. 558-559.

36 He came from Saqiyat al-Ḥamrā' or Fez, regions where the Shādhiliyya was very active. See R. J. Jenkins, "The evolution of religious brotherhoods in North and Northwest Africa 1523-1900," in John R. Willis (ed.), *Studies in West African History: I. The Cultivators of Islam* (London: F. Cass, 1979), p. 46; Mercedes Garcia-Arenal, "Sainteté et pouvoir dynastique au Maroc: la résistance de Fès aux Sa'diens," *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 4 (1990), pp. 1019-1042

37 Blondy, "Présentation," p. 45; Martin, "Ahmad Rasim Pasha," p. 562.

38 John Wright, *Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara* (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1989), p. 44.

39 Did they even actually pronounce the *khutba* in the name of Aḥmad al-Manṣūr (Maikorema, *Les raisons d'une ambassade*, p. 19)?

40 Dramani-Issifou, *L'Afrique Noire*, p. 133; Bernard Rosenberger, *Le Maroc au XVI[e] siècle au seuil de la modernité* (Paris: Fondation des trois cultures, 2008), p. 175.